Vacancy chains can be tracked in any context where a scarce resource flows through different owners, such as employment positions. However, under certain conditions vacancy chains, rather than market or other forms of competition, determine the allocation of the resource. This article develops a computational and formal model of vacancy chains as a mechanism for resource allocation in order to find out its properties with respect to organizational forms.
Introduction
Allocation of scarce resources may be achieved by means of monetary compromises enabled by market interactions, by means of open fights, or by means of a combination of incomplete information and idiosyncratic needs engendered by a particular organization. Both market interactions and open fights involve competition. On the contrary, resource allocation does not require competition if only one subject is able to fulfill certain requirements to the knowledge of those who must assign a resource. Eventually, competition may be fierce in order to enter someone's information set or to be considered just unique. However, once this is done, no competition takes place in the sense that two merchants compete on price or two warriors compete on strength.
Consider for instance internal labor markets. Most of the times, promotion of subordinates does not take place by posting available positions and hiring the one who offers the longest working hours for the lowest wage. Most of the times, managers observe subordinates long enough to know their abilities and eventually offer a position to the one they deem is most able to do a particular job. In this particular example, a lot of competition may have taken place among subordinates in order to be deemed the most able to cover that position. However, the position was not allocated by means of an open competition, but simply because only one person was around when it became available. We shall see other examples where the same mechanism of resource allocation operates without any form of competition.
Note also that in the above example a market is still there, in the sense that the managers and the selected subordinate contract a wage. However, this market did not operate as a mechanism for the allocation of a scarce resource. The scarce resource -the position -was allocated by focusing on a sufficiently narrow information set -i.e. the employees at a particular plant -and by requiring sufficiently idiosyncratic competences. We shall see examples where the same mechanism of resource allocation operates without any residual role for the market.
It is important to realize that the above view of the labor market is opposite to that neoclassical economics. In fact, the latter assumes willful accumulation of human capital in order to obtain certain positions. On the contrary, the above view assumes that positions are available independently of the capabilities of applicants, and that a position is only assigned if it becomes vacant [12] [14] [8] . Since a vacant position is eventually occupied by someone who makes another position available, chains of vacancies are triggered whenever an incumbent dies or retires [25] [24] . Eventually, vacancy chains stop if the resource is destroyed or exits the field of observation.
However, since real organizations are characterized by a mixture of vacancy chains and markets or other allocative mechanisms based on competition, a va-cancy chain may stop to operate as a mechanism for resource allocation well before its end. Consider again the case of internal labor markets. A vacancy may be triggered by a retirement, which triggers a chain of vacancies through subordinates. At the beginning only one subordinate is available to replace the retired employee, so the vacancy chain acts as a means for allocating a resource. However, by descending the hierarchy jobs may become less idiosyncratic, until two or more equally qualified persons apply for the same position. From that point, the resource is allocated by the market. However, the vacancy chain can still be traced through employees of decreasing status and eventually through the external labor market. The fact that a vacancy chain is identified does not imply that it is the prime mover of resource allocation. Likewise, the fact that a monetary transaction takes place does not imply that a resource is allocated by the market.
This distinction has never been explicitly stated in empirical research on vacancy chains. However, all empirical investigations have focused on situations where vacancy chains, at least in their initial steps, did operate as allocation mechanisms. A closer examination of the empirical literature will shed light on this as well as previous issues:
• Internal labor markets have been mentioned as the prototypical example of resource allocation by means of vacancy chains. For instance, an empirical study of a corporation operating in the forestry business highlighted that although posting available positions to all employees was the company's official policy, two thirds of actual staffing decisions were made by means of vacancy chains [11] . Indeed, theoretical considerations suggest that organizations fill their lowest positions by means of labor markets, but openings higher up in the hierarchy are assigned by means of vacancy chains [2] . The first application of vacancy chains was made to the occupancy of parish churches of increasing size [25] [24] . With hindsight we may recognize that this field suits vacancy chains particularly well because ministers are appointed mainly depending on age, so no more than one applicant is available for each position. For similar reasons vacancy chains apply to civil servants, such as policemen [21] [20] [9] or doctors [1] . An interesting instance is provided by highly specialized professionals whose competencies may be sufficiently unique to be hired by means of vacancy chains. In cases of extreme specialization such as professional football coaches, no two of them are equal [18] [19] .
• A housing market does exist, but houses and apartments of good quality are so diverse from one another, and their value depends so much on personal taste, that prospective renters or owners generally wait until a house or apartment that satisfies their aspirations becomes avalaible before leaving the one they are occupying. Also in this case, a scarce resource is allocated by means of vacancy chains. On the contrary, cheap apartments are likely to be allocated by the market to the extent they are roughly homogeneous to one another. The vacancy chain model has been successfully applied to the housing market [10] [7] , though no effort has been made to ascertain at what point the vacancy chains cease to operate as allocation mechanism. However, it is interesting to remark that an economic model of chains in the housing market had to assume idiosyncratic and discontinuous preferences in order to reproduce empirical data [17] . Possibly, the vacancy chains model with its disregard of individual preferences and its emphasis on available resources might be very close to reality.
• Hermit crabs use abandoned gastropod shells as shelters, which they carry with them once they entered one. Crabs of increasing age need shells of increasing size. Thus, an empty shell released in the environment triggers a chain of vacancies of smaller shells. Experiments have been made where one shell was released at a time in a pond where the density of crabs was sufficiently low for there being only one crab in the proximity of a shell [5] [4]. Thus, in this case the vacancy chains act as a mechanism for resource allocation. Note also that no competition takes place, not even for the selection of the prospective occupier as in internal labor market. However, if two or more hermit crabs are in the proximity of an empty shell which both of them like, they fight for it [4] . In this case, albeit a vacancy chain can still be traced, it does not operate as allocation mechanism. The fight does.
• Vacancy chains have been used for decentralized routing of robots [15] [16].
Since we can view robots as carriers or transporters that must be assigned to alternative routes, this is also a problem of resource allocation. Interestingly, in order for vacancy chains to work it was necessary to add a constraint that impaired too many robots from servicing the same route at a time. Similarly to employees aspiring to better jobs, families aspiring to better houses and hermit crabs aspiring to better shells, some constraint must be there to ensure that only one candidate is ready to occupy a vacancy. If this is not the case some form of competition is in order to resolve the question, be it market competition or physical fight. In the case of robots, impairing competition was simpler than endowing them with a criterium to establish a winner.
Theoretical considerations and empirical experience have suggested conditions for the existence of vacancy chains. According to Chase, vacancy chains require that i) The resource units are reusable, discrete, identifiable and utilized by one individual or social group at a time; ii) A unit must be vacant before it can be taken by a new occupant; iii) Individuals must need or want new and usually "bigger" or "better" units; iv) Vacant units must be scarce; v) Most individuals in a group already must have units so they can leave one behind when they move to a new one [3] . According to Sørensen, vacancy chains require that a) The predetermined and well specified nature of positions; b) The indefinite duration of matches between people and positions; c) Allocations that represent the outcomes of authority decisions rather than market exchanges [13] .
While not contradictory to one another, only the condition (c) among the eight listed above cares that vacancy chains allocate resources rather than just tracking the allocation of resources made by the market or another means. The formulation adopted in this paper is more general, for it does not require that allocations "represent the outcomes of authority decisions" but simply that only one candidate is there for a certain role, as it happened in the experiments with hermit crabs. Furthermore, the alternative to allocation by means of vacancy chains is not necessarily the market but includes any form of open competition.
Since previous studies did not carefully separate the operation of vacancy chains as a device for resource allocation from vacancy chains as traces of resource allocations made by other means, the rest of this paper is devoted to this issue. Section 2 illustrates a computational model where vacancy chains stop as soon as they no longer act as a means for resource allocation. Section 3 provides an analytical description of the computational model. Section 4 explores the computational model in order to highlight some invariant properties of resource allocation by means of vacancy chains. Finally, section 5 concludes.
A Model of Vacancy Chains
The computational model is organized as follows. A set of agents are placed on a square. Each position on the square belongs to a stratum. Strata are ordered by decreasing importance, top to bottom of a hierarchy. It is a partial ordering, i.e. two or more agents may belong to the same stratum. Strata may represent hierarchical levels in an organization, or degrees of quality of houses, or size of shells, or path lengths in a routing problem, or else.
The model is initialized by producing vacancies at all positions belonging to a particular stratum. Subsequently, vacancies propagate to the lower strata.
At each step, an agent is eligible for a vacancy if it is close enough to it and if it belongs to a stratum that is just one grade lower. If there is only one such agent, occupation of the vacancy is made by private agreement so the vacancy chain acts as an allocation mechanism. The agent moves up, a new vacancy is produced and the chain proceeds. If, on the contrary, several agents are able to fill the vacancy, the resource must be allocated by competition. In this model, chains are truncated at this point.
The model is built on the NetLogo platform, available at <http:// ccl.northwestern.edu/ netlogo>. Figure 1 shows its graphical interface.
The area on the right of figure 1 entails the available positions. Positions are ordered according to the stratum to which they belong: White positions rank highest, followed by grays of increasing darkness.
Black positions belong to the stratum zero. If the other strata represent hierarchical levels in an organization, then the stratum zero represents the outer world. For instance it may represent the external job market, or homeless people, or shelless crabs, or idle robots.
The number of strata can be selected by means of the slider n-of-strata, which takes values between 1 and 10. If the number of strata is 1, then vacancy chains take place in an organization that is perfectly flat. Thus, the model area will entail positions of only two colors: white positions inside the organization, and black positions outside the organization. If the number of hierarchical levels is 2, the model area will entail positions of three colors: white positions for the managers, grey positions for their subordinates, and black positions outside the organization. And so on, obviously.
The distribution of strata represents the organization of positions in terms of importance. As we shall see, the organizational form has a strong impact on the properties of of vacancy chains. In particular, in the model positions can be assigned to strata according to the following distributions:
1. A decreasing exponential distribution from low to high strata, if strata--distribution is set to 1. The functional form is f (k) = e −αk , α ∈ R , where s ∈ N is the number of strata and k = 0, 1, 2 . . . s. This distribution corresponds to the familiar experience of a hierarchy with far less managerial positions than subordinate positions. With respect to a pyramidal structure, a decreasing exponential describes a hierarchy where the ratio of the number of positions in neighboring strata is lower in lower strata than in upper strata. Thus, career advancements are most difficult at the bottom of the hierarchy. This representation is consistent with classical accounts of the span of control [6] as well as with mathematical applications of vacancy chains to organizations [12] .
2. A decreasing exponential distribution from high to low strata, if strata--distribution is set to 2. The functional form is f (k) = e −α(s−k) , α ∈ R , where s ∈ N is the number of strata and k = 0, 1, 2 . . . s. This distribution corresponds to an inverted hierarchy with many more managers than subordinates. It is a clearly irrealistic organizational form, that has been considered in order to evaluate the effect of an assumptions that is opposite to the usual one. 4. Half the positions assigned to strata according to a decreasing exponential distribution from low to high strata as in the above point (1), half the positions assigned to strata according to a poisson distribution from high to low strata, if strata-distribution is set to 4. In this second case the functional form is
where s ∈ N is the number of strata and k = 0, 1, 2 . . . s. This mixed distribution generates a hierarchy with proportionately less middle managers than a simple pyramid. This structure is such that upward movement is more difficult for middle managers than for both top managers and low-level employees, the so-called "Venturi tube" effect [23] [22] . Figure 2 illustrates the charts corresponding to the above distributions Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Figure 3 Hierarchy, mixed distribution The Venturi tube effect
¡ " " ¡ " ¡ " well as the ratio of the number of positions in neighboring strata. Details on the algorithms implementing these distributions are explained in the appendix. Positions are placed in a space of acquaintances (see figure 1) . This means that a vacancy in a certain position is known to its neighbors but not to other agents in the organization. Vacancies propagate if in the neighborhood of a vacancy on stratum i there is one and only one position at stratum i − 1.
The button "neighborhood" can be either set to 4, 8 or 24 depending on the number of neighbors each agent is supposed to be acquainted with. Figure 4 illustrates their corresponding shapes.
In order to run the model, the following buttons should be pressed:
1. The Setup Positions button assigns each position on the model area to a stratum, which is denoted by a shade of grey;
2. The Setup Vacancies button creates vacancies at all positions belonging to the "starting stratum", which become green;
3. The Go button makes the vacancies diffuse down the hierarchy, creating yellow stripes.
The outcome of the simulation is the distribution of chains length that appears at bottom left in figure 1 . Furthermore, if the option "verbose" is switched on, the Command Center displays how long was the chain created by each vacancy.
It may be necessary to run the model several times with the same set of parameters in order to obtain average values. The button Iterate, in combination with the slider times, fulfills this need. At the end of the last iteration, the average number of chains of each length appears on the Command Center.
Markov Chains
In the seminal work where vacancy chains were first introduced, an analytical description based on Markov chains was proposed [25] [24] . In this section, the agent-based model presented in § 2 will be described in terms of Markov chains. 1 Let p i j denote the probability that a vacancy in stratum i moves to stratum j, with i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . s where s is the number of strata over the zero level. In particular, since stratum 0 represents the outer world, the probability that a vacancy moves from stratum i to the outside is p i0 .
Let us arrange probabilities p i j in a (s + 1) × (s + 1) matrix P. The model expounded in § 2 assumed that a vacancy can only move one stratum lower at each step. Thus, it implicitly assumed that P has the following form:
where the (0, 0) element is 1 because vacancies cannot move once they reached stratum 0. Probabilities p i j are such that ∑ j p i j = 1. Since ∀i the only non-zero elements are p i(i−1) and p ii , and since p ii = 1 − p i(i−1) , probabilities p i(i−1) are sufficient to determine P.
It is now our task to express probabilities p i(i−1) in terms of the parameters of the model presented in § 2. Let us first consider the case of a uniform distribution of strata (strata-distribution set to 3).
Let n denote the size of the neighborhood, with n ∈ {4, 8, 24}. The number of ways of arranging any number of (s + 1) different strata in n positions is the number of dispositions with repetition of s + 1 elements of class n, which is equal to (s + 1) n . This will be the denominator of the fraction that yields the p i(i−1) s.
The number of dispositions where a particular position is on a particular stratum, all others being on any different stratum, is s n−1 . The number of dispositions where any position is on a particular stratum, all others being on any different stratum, is n s n−1 . Thus, the probability of finding exactly one position on the required stratum in a neighborhood of size n is:
Let us now consider the case of a non-uniform distribution of strata (strata--distribution set to 1, 2 or 4). Let f (k), k = 0, 1, 2, . . . s denote the distribution of strata. For instance, in § 2 we considered hierarchies with f (k) = e −αk .
A non-uniform distribution of strata implies that certain strata are overrepresented, others are underrepresented. Instead of s, we should consider the integral of f (k). On the numerator, this integral extends over the s strata obtained by excluding the i-th one. On the denominator, this integral extends over all s + 1 strata. Furthermore, the n at the numerator should be corrected by f (i − 1). In conclusion, we obtain:
which reduces to eq. 1 if f (k) = 1, ∀k. Let us consider the matrix P s . Its (i, j)-th element is the sum of the probabilities of all chains that start at stratum i and end at stratum j in s moves. Thus, these probabilities describe the outcomes of the simulation model expounded in § 2.
Matrix P s can be used to derive statistics about the length of vacancy chains. For instance, ∀i > 0 the sum of the elements of P s for j < i represents the probability that a chain starting at stratum i has a length greater than one. The reader will note that this quantity corresponds to the indicator that will be observed in § 4.
Some Experiments
The aim of the model is to investigate whether there exists any regularity in the formation of vacancy chains depending on the number of strata, the starting stratum, the size of the neighborhood and the organizational structure. Since the equation derived in § 3 can only be solved numerically, all investigations will be directly carried out on the numerical model of § 2.
Let us explore the behavior of the model on hierarchical organizations. Let us pose strata-distribution to 1 and investigate what happens to the chain length distribution when when n-of-strata, starting-stratum and neighborhood change. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of chain length in a hierarchical organization with 5 strata, where vacancies occur at the highest stratum, for various sizes of the neighborhood. It is clear that larger neighborhoods produce longer vacancy chains, evidently because it is easier to find an agent who is occupying a position exactly one stratum lower than the one where a vacancy occurred. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of chain length in a hierarchical organization with 5 strata, where vacancies occur at stratum 3, for various neighborhood sizes. Here the picture is opposite to that of figure 5. In fact, larger neighborhoods produce shorter chains. Evidently, low hierarchical levels are so many that with larger neighborhoods more than one agent able to fill the vacancy is found, so the chain stops.
Chain Length
The difference between figures 5 and 6 is extremely interesting. In fact, it suggests that for certain organizations and for certain starting strata, increasing information and communications (the size of the neighborhood) does not create markets or other forms of resource allocation by competition. Rather, increasing information fosters resource allocation by means of vacancy chains. For other organizations and starting strata, it is just the opposite. Thus, it is interesting to see which parameters originate distributions like in figure 5 as opposed to those that originate distributions like in figure 6 . combinations of the number of strata and starting stratum. Vacancy chains of length one are isolated vacancies. Thus, the proportion of vacancy chains of length greater than one over total vacancy chains denotes the proportion of vacancies that actually originate a chain before market competition intervenes. This will be called the proportion of vacancy chains henceforth. Parameter combinations such that the proportion of vacancy chains increases with neighborhood size (like in figure 5 ) have been denoted by an upward arrow. Parameters combinations such that the proportion of vacancy chains decreases with neighborhood size (like in figure 6 ) have been denoted by a downward arrow. Finally, curve arrows denote combinations of parameters where the proportion of chains increases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 4 to 8 but decreases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 8 to 24. Figure 7 highlights that there exists a region where vacancy chains are favored by more information (larger neighborhood), separated from a region where vacancy chains are impaired by more information (larger neighborhood). The area between these two regions is rather thin, and almost horizontal. Thus, the effect of information on the proportion of vacancy chains does not depend on the number of strata. On the contrary, the starting stratum is crucial. Only vacancy chains originating sufficiently high in the hierarchy are favored by more information.
Let us consider inverted hierarchies, i.e. organizations where there are far more high-ranked positions than low-ranked ones. Let us pose strata-distribution to 2, all other parameters as above. Figure 8 shows quite a different pattern from figure 7. Contrary to the previous case, vacancy chains are impaired by more information if they start close to the top of the inverted hierarchy, whereas they are favored by more information if they are sufficiently far from it. Furthermore, note that the separating region is not horizontal. Thus, the effect of information on the proportion of vacancy chains depends on both the number of strata and the starting stratum.
Let us consider the intermediate organizational structure considered in this model, the linear organization obtained by setting strata-distribution to 3. Figure 9 illustrates the corresponding table.
This intermediate organizational form does not exhibit intermediate properties between the hierarchy and the inverted hierarchy. Since it has the same number of positions in any stratum, the starting stratum does not affect the outcome.
In both the hierarchy and the inverted hierarchy, larger neighborhoods have a positive impact on the proportion of vacancy chains when contiguous strata have a very different number of positions (at the top of a hierarchy, at the bottom of an inverted hierarchy). In the linear organization, any two strata have the same number of positions. Thus, larger neighborhoods -i.e. more informationnever has a positive impact on the proportion of vacancy chains. The impact is generally negative or, if there are sufficiently many strata first positive and then negative. These are the curve arrows on the right of figure 9 . Finally, organizations with less middle managers than purely pyramidal organizations (see figure 3) are very important for studies on vacancy chains [23] [22] . In fact, figure 10 shows that this organizational form is such that in any case a small increase of information always favors the allocation of resources by means of vacancy chains (curve arrows). Furthermore, most of the times even a large increase of information favors the allocation of resources by means of vacancy chains (upward arrows). Thus, organization with shapes as in figure 3 are likely to make a large use of vacancy chains in order to allocate resources.
Note that a common feature of figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 is that all curve arrows first go up and then turn down, no one does the opposite. In other words, it never happens that by slightly increasing the size of the neighborhood the chains of vacancies become shorter and by increasing it further they become longer. It is so because larger neighborhoods may allow longer chains to the extent that they provide more agents able to fill a vacancy, and this effect is most prominent when the neighborhood is still small and does not include one instance of each stratum. Conversely, larger neighborhoods may force chains to be short to the extent that they include several instances in the same stratum, and this effect becomes prominent when the neighborhood becomes very large. 
Conclusions
The simulations carried out in this paper highlighted that organizations have a large influence on the ability of vacancy chains to act as a device for allocating scarce resources. In particular, hierarchical organizational forms with less middle managers than straight pyramids are most likely to be regulated by vacancy chains. Considering that since decades most organizations tend to reduce the size of of middle management, this finding makes vacancy chains a very relevant issue. Also, compare this result with the conclusions of economic theory. According to economic theory, the more information is available, the better the markets work. Eventually, markets fail because information is asymmetric or incomplete. According to the economics of information, if information asymmetries would be removed from the labor market, the loan market or the "market for lemons", then prices would suffice to allocate resources optimally.
Economic theory reaches this result because it is based on structureless markets. On the contrary, we have found that within certain organizational forms more information cause the market to be superseded by vacancy chains. Since these organizational forms are quite common, the finding that information may 
